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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Appellant is Jacob Williams ("Williams"). Williams is the Plaintiff in the 
case before the trial court. The Appellees are Craig Alan Anderson, Quinn Zite, and 
Anderson/Zite, LLC (f/k/a Fix A Phone, LLC). Appellees were the Defendants in the 
case before the trial court. 
1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ............................................................................. i 
TABLE OF CONIBNTS ................................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................. iv 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUE PRESERVATION ............................................ 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ......................................................................................... 4 
A. Williams' Comp lain t .............................................................................................. 4 
B. Discovery In This Matter ....................................................................................... 4 
C. Defendants' Motion In Limine And The District Court's Order .......................... .5 
SUMI\1ARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 9 
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 10 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 15 
CERTIFICAIB OF COMPLIAN"CE ................................................................................. 17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 18 
ADDENDUM .................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page(s) 
A1za Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34435 (D. Del. April 28, 2008) .............................................. 17 
Am. Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 
2002 UT App 16 ............................................................................................................. 7 
Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 
2009 UT 52 ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Costello v. Patterson Dental Supply, Inc., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25636 (W.D. Mich. April 5, 2007) ........................................ 20 
Gutierrez-Howerton v. Gonzales, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79511 (D. Nev. June 11, 2014) .............................................. 17 
Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 
287 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................... 20 
Meneweather v. Powell, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143292 (N.D. Cal. December 13, 2011) ................................ 17 
Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 
2009 UT 44 ..................................................................................................................... 8 
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 54 ................................................................................................................... l 7 
Other Authorities 
vJ Moore's Federal Practice 3D, § 26.22[ 4][ c] [ii] ................................................................. 17 
Rule 26(d)(4) ...................................................................................................................... 20 
Rule 26( d)(5) ...................................................................................................................... l 6 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a){l){C) .................................................................................. 7, 8, 15, 17 
Utah R. Civ. P 26( d) .......................................................................................................... 20 
111 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. @ 
§ 78A-4-103(2)G). 
IV 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUE PRESERVATION 
Issue: Did the trial court err in prohibiting Appellant from presenting any 
evidence of damages in support of his claims for an alleged failure to provide a 
"computation of any damages" as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(C). 
Standard of Review: Two standards of review are applicable to this appeal. First, 
the standard of review is "correctness" in regard to the Trial Court's interpretation of 
Rule 26. Second, if the Trial Court's interpretation of Rule 26 was correct and Williams 
failed to comply with Rule 26, did the Trial Court's order result in an abuse of discretion. 
As summarized by this Court: "AIM argues the trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of part of Durbano' s billing statements because AIM did not supplement its 
discovery requests. Trial courts have 'broad discretion in selecting and imposing 
sanctions for discovery violations .... ' However, 'the proper interpretation of a rule of 
procedure is a question of law, and we review the trial court's decision for correctness.'" 
Am. Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, , 10 ( internal quotations and 
citations omitted); see also Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52,, 35 ("In 
applying the abuse of discretion standard to the district court's imposition of a particular 
sanction, we give the district court a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair 
and efficient manner to conduct court business because the district court judge is in the 
best position to evaluate the status of his [ or her] cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, 
and credibility of the parties. Thus, we will determine that a district court 'has abused its 
discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if there is either an erroneous 
conclusion oflaw or no evidentiary basis for the [district] court's ruling."). 
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Preservation of the Issues: Williams opposed Defendants' motion in limine 
seeking the exclusion of damages-related evidence and presented argument before the 
Trial Court. (R. 505-522; 912-960). Thus, Williams adequately preserved the issue for 
appeal. See Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc, 2009 UT 44, iJ 23 ("An issue is 
preserved if it is raised in a timely fashion, clearly identified, and adequately briefed."). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The lawsuit underlying this interlocutory appeal arises from a business dispute. 
Williams and Defendants were co-owners in a Utah company known as Fix-A-Phone, 
LLC ("Fix-A-Phone"). As alleged in Williams' complaint, Defendants engaged in 
numerous wrongful acts to exclude Williams from Fix-A-Phone, including the issuance 
of a fraudulent and unnecessary capital call that purportedly resulted in Williams' 30% 
ownership interest in Fix-A-Phone being "cancelled." Shortly after Defendants secured 
Williams' ownership interest, Defendants sold Fix-A-Phone's assets to a company known 
as Tricked Out Accessories, Inc. {"Tricked Out"). 
Williams filed suit asserting, among other claims, that he was still a thirty-percent 
owner in Fix-A-Phone at the time of the sale. Williams' initial disclosures included a 
computation of damages, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(C), stating that "Plaintiff 
Jacob D. Williams is entitled to 30% of the price Tricked Out Services, Inc. paid for Fix 
A Phone, LLC, as well as 30% of any equity or ownership interest Defendants may have 
in Tricked Out Services, Inc." In discovery, Williams learned that Defendants sold Fix-
A-Phone's assets for $200,000.00. Williams did not amend his Rule 26 disclosures to 
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state that he was entitled to "30% of the $200,000.00"; rather, his initial disclosures 
continued to state that he was "entitled to 30% of the price ... paid for Fix-A-Phone .... " 
A jury trial was set for September 7 - 9, 2015. On August 4, 2015, Defendants 
filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent Williams "from opining or otherwise 
presenting damages-related evidence." As grounds for their motion, Defendants argued 
that Williams had "failed to comply with his obligations under Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(l )(C) because he had failed to provided "a computation of any damages .... " 
( emphasis in original). Williams filed an opposition arguing that his initial disclosures 
plainly stated a computation of the damages requested-that is, "30% of the price 
Tricked Out Services Inc. paid for Fix a Phone LLC" and that it was undisputed that the 
sales price was $200,000.00, which Defendants knew since they had signed the contract 
selling Fix A Phone. 
On September 3, 2015, Judge Faust held oral argument on Defendants' motion. 
The next day, Judge Faust issued a memorandum decision granting Defendants' motion 
thereby prohibiting Williams from presenting any evidence of damages. See Addendum 
Exhibit A attached hereto. The parties then filed a joint stipulated order striking the trial 
dates given Judge Faust's ruling on Defendants' motion. On October 13, 2015, Judge 
Faust entered an order stating that Defendants' motion "is granted. Williams is and shall 
be prevented from opining on or otherwise presenting damages-related evidence at the 
trial of this matter." See Addendum Exhibit B attached hereto. On October 26, 2015, 
Williams filed his petition seeking interlocutory appeal. 
3 
A. 
STATElVIENT OF THE FACTS 
Williams' Complaint. 
1. Williams filed a complaint against Defendants asserting claims for 
declaratory judgment, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. (R. 1-14). 
2. Williams' complaint alleged that Defendants had engaged in numerous 
wrongful acts, resulting ultimately in the purported cancellation of Williams' thirty-
percent ownership interest in Fix-A-Phone. As Defendants sold the assets of Fix-A-
Phone shortly after allegedly cancelling Williams' thirty-percent ownership interest, 
Williams sought a declaratory judgment stating that: 
a. Williams' thirty percent (30%) ownership in Defendant Fix A Phone 
was never cancelled. Williams therefore was a thirty percent (30%) owner 
of Defendant Fix A Phone at the time of the January 2013 sale to Tricked 
Out Services, Inc., for an unknown amount, and Williams is entitled to 
recover thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price. 
b. Williams is a thirty percent (30%) owner of any equity or ownership 
interest that I?efendant Anderson and/or Defendant Zite possesses in 
Tricked Out Services, Inc., or in any money owed by Tricked Out Services, 
Inc., to Defendant Anderson and/or Defendant Zite. 
(R. 7-8). 
3. Because the sale price was unknown, and Williams reasonably believed 
Fix-A-Phone was sold for over $1,000,000.00, the case was designated Tier III for 
discovery purposes. (R. 7). 
B. Discovery In This Matter. 
4. After Defendants' motion to dismiss was denied (R. 99), Williams provided 
his Rule 26(a) initial disclosures. (R. 453-459). In regard to damages, Williams stated: 
"Plaintiff Jacob D. Williams is entitled to 30% of the price Tricked Out Services, Inc. 
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paid for Fix-A-Phone, LLC as well as 30% of any equity or ownership interest 
·'-!} Defendants may have in Tricked Out Services, Inc ..... " (R. 485). 
5. Williams learned in discovery that Fix-A-Phone's assets were sold to 
Tricked Out Services, Inc. for $200,000.00. As Defendants had executed the asset 
purchase agreement on behalf of Fix-A-Phone (as Williams' ownership interest had 
allegedly been "cancelled"), Defendants knew the purchase price was $200,000.00 and 
that thirty-percent of the purchase price equaled $60,000.00. (R. 538-554). 
6. Williams subsequently amended his initial disclosures as discovery 
progressed. The language referenced in paragraph 4 above remained the same, with 
Williams stating his entitlement to "30% of the price Tricked Out Services, Inc. paid for 
Fix-A-Phone LLC .... " (R. 470-476). Williams did not specifically identify "the price 
Tricked Out Services, Inc. paid for Fix A Phone LLC" as the $200,000.00 set forth in the 
asset purchase agreement. 
7. Notwithstanding the "Tier III" discovery designation, the parties did not 
engage in an extensive amount of discovery. A couple sets of written discovery were 
exchanged and three depositions were taken. (R. 163-164, 186-187, 199-200, 230-231, 
251-252, 255-256, 318-319, 330-332, 338-339, 376-377, 384-385). 
C. Defendants' Motion In Limine And The District Court's Order. 
8. As trial approached, Defendants filed a motion in limine requesting that the 
District Court "issue an order in limine preventing [Williams] from opining on or 
otherwise presenting damages related evidence." (R. 439-476). 
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9. Defendants argued that Williams had "failed to comply with his obligations 
under Rule 26(a)(l)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures" by failing to provide "a 
computation of any damages claims .... " (Id.). Defendants argued that "Williams' 
purported 'calculation' leaves out all inputs - it is no calculation at all, but a mere 
disclosure that represents no thought, planning, or preparation other than to rely upon 
Williams' purported 30% interest in Fix-A-Phone and to state that Williams gets 30% of 
whatever exits." (Id.) 
10. Williams filed an opposition, pointing out that there was no dispute that 
Fix-A-Phone's assets were sold for $200,000.00 and therefore Williams was entitled to 
thirty-percent of that amount. As part of the opposition, Williams attached an email from 
Defendants' counsel stating that "my clients' position is that they sold the assets of the 
Fix A Phone business for $200,000, per the purchase agreement. Any further 
compensation they receive is in consideration for the services they are required to render 
per the contract. (In other words, if they don't consult, they don't get paid). Therefore, 
the most Mr. Williams can recover, even ifhe succeeds on 100% of his claims, is 30% of 
$200,000, or $60,000." (R. 505-522). 
11. Defendants filed a reply (R. 525-569) in which they argued that at 
Williams' deposition, he "continued to insist that his damages consisted not only of 30% 
of $200,000, but also 30% of any compensation Tricked Out Services, Inc. ("Tricked 
Out") paid Defendants for consulting services rendered." He testified: 
Q. Do you know how much the company did sell for? 
A. Two hundred, plus a percentage of the stores' s profit or revenue. 
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Q. If Mr. Anderson and Mr. Zite work as consultants; right? 
A. I would need to check it. 
Q. Okay. And your knowledge of this is just based on receiving the 
agreement in this litigation from Tricked Out? 
A. Right. 
Q. Have you actually read that agreement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have; right? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 528, 566-567). 
12. Judge Faust held oral argument on September 2, 2015. (R. 912-960). At 
oral argument, Defendants' counsel admitted that they had known all along Fix a Phone 
had sold for $200,000.00: 
THE COURT: Hang on for a moment. 
Did you, in fact, always know from the 
beginning, even at the time of the filing of the 
complaint, that the company sold for $200,000 -
MR. BROUGH: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- and not for what was 
alleged in the complaint? 
MR. BROUGH: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BROUGH: That's correct. 
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(R. 929). Defendants subsequently tried to argue that Williams might be asserting that 
the $200,000.00 price was "depressed" or otherwise inadequate, but admitted to Judge 
Faust that no such allegation had ever been raised in the case: 
THE COURT: And so as it's disclosed to 
them, this component's zero, well, that takes care of 
that one. This is 200,000. That takes care of that 
one. 
Now, if they had had some documents or 
some damages on their side that you didn't have in 
your possession and they failed to give it to you and 
didn't disclose it to you, then I think it's clear. 
No question. But I -- I'm struggling to -- to see 
any financial aspects or components of the actual 
substantive money issues that we're talking about 
here that they had or that they knew about except for 
getting them through you guys. 
MR. BROUGH: And I -- and I understand and 
appreciate the Court's question and desire to kind of 
get the right answer here. Let -- let me explain it 
this way: Rule 26 makes it mandatory and automatic 
to exclude what is not disclosed. 
And what wasn't disclosed here? 
I understand that the plaintiffs argument 
is, okay, we told you 30 percent of X, you guys know 
what X is. I mean, you got the asset purchase 
agreement right there, you know nothing else was 
paid. You lmow that. 
Well, here's what I don't know. Here's 
what I don't know: I don't know if you're claiming 
that there was some sort of collusion between the --
and that the purchase price was depressed. I don't 
!mow what you're saying the sales price is. 
THE COURT: Was that--was that ever 
raised? 
MR. BROUGH: It was -- no, it was never 
raised. 
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(R. 953-955). 
THE COURT: So that's a hypothetical. 
MR. BROUGH: It is a hypothetical. I 
don't know that. But the reason that I don't know 
that is because I can't look at their pleading to 
determine it, nor can I look at their disclosures to 
determine-
THE COURT: But if you asked him--you 
asked him in his deposition what he -- what he 
thought his damages were. 
MR. BROUGH: Right. 
13. On September 3, 2015, Judge Faust issued a memorandum decision 
granting Defendants' motion. The Trial Court held: "Plaintiff further argues Defendants 
always knew of his demand on damages as being thirty percent (30%) of whatever the 
company sold for and the Defendants had this information in their possession. A claim of 
a fixed percentage for damages does not comply with the requirement to disclose a 
calculation of the damages a plaintiff is required to disclosure under Rule 26." See 
Addendum Exhibit A attached hereto; see also R. 693-698. On October 13, 2015, the 
Trial Court entered an order granting Defendants' motion in limine. See Addendum 
Exhibit B; see also R. 801-802. 
SUMJ.VIARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(C) requires a party to provide a "computation of any 
damages claimed .... " Williams did exactly that. In his Rule 26 disclosures, Williams 
stated that, as a thirty-percent owner in Fix A Phone at the time it was sold, he was 
entitled to thirty percent of the actual sale price of Fix A Phone. And while Williams did 
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not know Fix A Phone's sale price when he filed his initial disclosures, Defendants 
certainly did, as Defendants had executed the contract selling Fix A Phone's assets for 
$200,000.00. 
The comments to Rule 26, as well as Federal caselaw interpreting similar 
language, recognizes that the purpose of the Rule 26 damages disclosures is to facilitate 
an exchange of information and avoid unfair surprise in regard to "the nature and extent" 
of a party's damage. Here, Williams' Rule 26 disclosures plainly articulated the nature of 
his damage (being excluded from the sale) as well as the extent of his damage ( thirty-
percent of the Fix A Phone sale price). In doing so, Williams complied with both the 
letter and spirit of Rule 26. Defendants' argument that "30% of the sale price of Fix A 
Phone" is inadequate and needed instead to read "30% of the $200,000.00 sale price of 
Fix A Phone" should be rejected. 
But even if Williams did not comply with Rule 26 in a technical sense, any failure 
to supplement Williams' initial disclosures was harmless under Rule 26(d)(5), and the 
Trial Court's decision to impose the drastic sanction of prohibiting all damages evidence 
was an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(C) states that a party shall serve on the other parties: "a 
computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable documents or 
evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials about the 
nature and extent of injuries suffered." According to Professor Moore, such "initial 
disclosures may be sufficiently specific if they, coupled with other information made 
10 
available to the other parties earlier during the course of the proceedings, provide the 
other parties with an adequate basis to evaluate the injury the disclosing party has 
suffered." Moore's Federal Practice 3D, § 26.22[4][c][ii]. 
Utah appellate courts have not addressed the fundamental purpose of the Rule 26 
disclosure requirements or the definition of the phrase "a computation of any damages." 
Federal courts considering the issue have identified two primary goals for this disclosure 
requirement. First, as the Advisory Committee's notes to the 1993 amendment state, "a 
major purpose of the Rule 26(a) initial disclosure requirement is to accelerate the 
exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate the paperwork involved in 
requesting such information." See~, Gutierrez-Howerton v. Gonzales, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 79511, *5 (D. Nev. June 11, 2014); Meneweather v. Powell, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 143292, *2-3 (N.D. Cal. December 13, 2011) ("The purpose of Rule 26 initial 
disclosures is to accelerate the exchange of basic information, encourage counsel to 
evaluate the case, and enhance settlement opportunities."). Second, "the purpose of the 
initial disclosures provided for in Rule 26 is to prevent a party from being unfairly 
surprised by the presentation of new evidence." Alza Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34435, *5 (D. Del. April 28, 2008) citing Astraxeneca AB v. 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 491,510 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 1 
The 2011 Utah Advisory Committee notes shed further light on the purpose of 
Rule 26's damage disclosure requirement, stating that "[t]he amendments also require 
1 "Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ~ 7 n.2 citing Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ,r 26. 
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parties to provide more information about damages early in the case. Too often, the 
subject of damages is deferred until late in the case." The 2011 Advisory Notes then 
state "the subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert discovery. 
Parties should make a good faith attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible 
to do so and must in any event provide all discoverable information on the subject, 
including materials related to the nature and extent of the damages." The consequence of 
failing to disclose is also discussed: "To make the disclosure meaningful, and to 
discourage sandbagging, parties must lrnow that if they fail to disclose important 
information that is helpful to their case, they will not be able to use that information at 
trial. The courts will be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure." 
The question here is what "important information," if any, did Williams "fail to 
disclose?" In Williams' complaint, and then consistently throughout discovery, Williams 
maintained that he was "entitled to 30% of the price Tricked Out Services, Inc. paid for 
Fix-A-Phone, LLC .... " Williams did not identified his damages in a vague or 
conclusoryway; rather, he stated his specific belief that he was entitled to 30% of the 
actual amount paid for Fix-A-Phone by the purchaser. In doing so, he identify the 
"nature" of his damage (which was being excluded from the sale of Pix-A-Phone to 
Tricked Out) as well as the extent of his damages (which was thirty percent ofFix-A-
Phone's actual sale price). Williams did not "sandbag;" to the contrary, he was explicit 
and forthright. 
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Defendants argued repeatedly to the Trial Court that they suffered prejudice 
because Williams never identified what he believed to be Fix A Phone's sale price. (R. 
448 - "The formula Williams provided is insufficient, based upon a single question: 30% 
of what? What does Williams claim is the sale price of Fix A Phone?"; R. 526 -
"Williams have never disclosed--- the figure he considers to be the sale price of Fix A 
Phone .... "). But Defendants lmew the actual sale amount at all times, as they executed 
the asset purchase agreement on Fix-A-Phone's behalf. Williams therefore could not 
"fail to disclose" to Defendants someWng that Defendants already knew. And Williams' 
initial disclosures were clear that he was seeking thirty percent of the "price [Tricked 
Out] paid for Fix A Phone, LLC .... " 
Williams never once argued that he was seeking anything more than his rightful 
percentage of the actual "price paid," which Defendants knew was $200,000.00. Indeed, 
during oral argument, Defendants admitted that Williams had never advocated that the 
sale price was too low or that Williams was entitled to more than thirty-percent of the 
price actually paid. See Statement of Fact No. 12 above. If Williams had made such an 
argument for damages, perhaps Defendants would have a point. But this "hypothetical" 
(as Judge Faust called it) never occurred because Williams never sought to recover more 
than thirty-percent of the price actually paid, as set forth in his initial disclosures. 
Moreover, Defendants and the Trial Court's memorandum decision refer to the 
requirement for a "calculation'' - a term not used in Rule 26 - rather than a 
"computation," which is the term used in Rule 26. But even assuming "calculation" and 
"computation" can be used interchangeably, Defendants and the Trial Court's definition 
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of"computation" is unduly narrow. Merriam-Webster defines "computation" as "la: the 
act or action of computing: Calculation; b: the use or operation of a computer; 2: a system 
of reckoning; and 3: an amount computed." See _Merriam-Webster.com (September 21, 
2015). Likewise, Courts have recognized (in different settings) that "computation" is 
defined as "the act or process to determine an amount or number." Costello v. Patterson 
Dental Supply, fuc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25636, *14 (W.D. Mich. April 5, 2007) 
quoting the American Heritage Dictionary, 3d Ed. 1996. Here, Williams plainly 
provided the "act or process" or the "calculation" or the "system or reckoning" by which 
the damages claimed were identified. 
For these reasons, the provisions of Utah R. Civ. P 26( d) governing the 
consequences of failing "to supplement timely a disclosure" cannot be applied to this 
situation. Specifically, Rule 26(d)(4) states that a party "may not use the undisclosed 
witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure." Here, there is no undisclosed "witness, 
document, or material'' as Defendants were in possession of the actual price paid for Fix-
A-Phone' s assets at all times. 
But even if there was a failure to supplement, it was necessarily harmless. 
Williams has not located any Utah law detailing the factors to consider if late 
supplementation is "harmless." The Tenth Circuit has identified four factors in making 
this determination: "(I) the prejudice or surprise to the opposing party; (2) the ability of 
the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which the evidence would disrupt the 
trial; and (4) the moving party's bad faith or willfulness." Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 
14 
287 F.3d 936, 954 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, each factor leads to the conclusion that any 
alleged failure to supplement did not harm Defendants in any way. 
First, the fact that Williams was seeking thirty-percent of$200,000.00 could not 
have surprised Defendants as they knew all along that was the sales price. There was no 
"new" or "surprise" evidence. Second, there is no prejudice to cure. The price Tricked 
Out paid for Fix A Phone is undisputed and well-known to Defendants. Williams' failure 
to include the number $200,000.00 in his initial disclosures in no way limited the 
Defendants' discovery efforts into the price paid for Fix A Phone or Williams' damages. 
Indeed, Defendants knew the entire time what price was paid and, in fact, asked Williams 
what he thought the price was during discovery. Nothing was left to discover on this 
issue. Third, allowing the jury to hear the evidence of the actual price paid would not 
have disrupted the trial in any way. Finally, Williams diligently fulfilled his discovery 
obligations in this case, including updating his initial disclosures on one occasion to 
provide Defendants with additional information. No evidence of bad faith or willfulness 
exists. 
CONCLUSION 
Williams' initial disclosure properly set forth a "computation" of his requested 
damages. As a result, the Trial Court's ruling that a "claim of a fixed percentage of 
damages does not comply with the requirement to disclose a calculation of damages ... " 
is erroneous and should be overturned by this Court. For the reasons set forth above, 
Williams respectfully requests that the Trial Court's order, dated October 13, 2015, be 
reversed. 
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DATED this 41:b. day ofMarch 2016. 
MICHAEL BEST & FRIED~CH, LLP 
Richard F. Ensor 
Attorneys for A,ppellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACOB D. WILLIAMS, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
CRAIG ALAN ANDERSON, an individual, 
QUINN ZITE, an individual, and 
ANDERSON ZITE, LLC, f/k/a FIX A 
PHONE, LLC, a Utah limited liability 
company, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 130901891 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on September 2, 2015 pursuant to 
Defendants/Counterclaimants' Motion in Limine. Following the hearing, the matter was taken 
under advisement. The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits attached 
thereto, as well as the arguments of counsel, hereby enters the following ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
With this motion, Defendants/Counterclaimants («Defendants") argue 
Plaintiff/Counterclaimant, Jacob D. Williams («Williams"), has failed to comply with his 
obligations under Rule 26(a)(l)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires all 
parties to a suit to provide "a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable 
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documents or evidentiary material on which such computation is based, including materials 
about the nature and extent of injuries suffered." Id According to Defendants, Williams has 
never provided a computation of his damages and as a result, an order in limine should issue 
preventing Williams from opining on or otherwise presenting damages-related evidence. 
Williams opposes the motion arguing over a year ago, Defendants' counsel stated that: 
[r]egarding mediation, my clients' position is that they sold the assets of the Fix-
A-Phone business for $200,000, per the purchase agreement. Any further 
compensation they receive is in consideration for the services they are required to 
render per the contract. Therefore, the most Mr. Williams can recover, even if he 
succeeds on 100% of his claims, is 30% of $200,000, or $60,000. 
It is Williams' position Defendants thus know (and have known since the beginning of the case) 
the amount that Williams is claiming for the sale of Williams' 30% interest in Fix-A-Phone "per 
the asset agreement" with Tricked Out Services:, Inc. 
RULING 
Rule 26(a)(l)(C) requires all parties to a suit to provide "a computation of any damages 
claimed and a copy of all discoverable documents or evidentiary material on which such 
computation is based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered." 
The Advisory Committee further stated: 
The amendments also require parties to provide more information 
about damages early in the case. Too often, the subject of damages 
is deferred until late in the case. Early disclosure of damages 
infonnation is important. Among other things:, it is a critical factor 
in determining proportionality. The committee recognizes that 
damages often require additional discovery, and typically are the 
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subject of expert testimony. The Rule is not intended to require 
expert disclosures at the outset of a case. At the same time, the 
subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert 
discovery. Parties should make a good faith attempt to compute 
damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event 
provide all discoverable information on the subject> including 
materials related to the nature and extent of the damages. 
The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the 
evidence may not be used in the party's case-in-chief. To make the 
disclosure requirement meaningful, and to discourage 
sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to disclose 
important information that is helpful to their case, they will not be 
able to use that infonnation at trial. The courts will be expected to 
enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good 
cause for the failure. 
Id. Adv. Comm. n. (2011). 
Applied to the facts of this case, the record indicates that Williams has not in fact agreed 
with Defendants that Fix-A-Phone sold for $200,000 and has contended that the purchase price 
includes the S0'Vo net profit calculation described in Section 2.02 of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement 
Additionally, in Williams' deposition, convened on June 5, 2014, he continued to insist 
that his damages consisted not only of 30% of $200,000> but also 30% of any compensation 
Tricked Out Services, Inc. ("Tricked Out") paid Defendants for consulting services rendered. 
Specifically, Williams stated: 
Q. Do you know how much the company did sell for? 
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A. Two hundred, plus a percentage of the stores 's profit or 
revenue. 
Q. Okay. And your knowledge of this is just based on receiving the 
agreement in this litigation from Tricked Out? 
A. Right. 
Q. Have you actually read that agreement? 
A. Yes. 
See Dep. Tr. Jacob D. Williams 
Accordingly, even after the February 14, 2014 email upon which Williams depends, he 
continued to insist that Fix-A-Phone sold its assets not just for $200,000, but for an additional 
percentage of Tricked Out's profits arising from the sold assets. 
Furthermore, Williams' own amended initial disclosures disclose, as an uncalculated 
category of damages) "any money owed by Tricked Out Services, Inc.,, to Defendants. That 
would include any profit payments owing pursuant to Section 2. 02 of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. In other words, Williams apparently seeks a share of the funds Tricked Out 
should pay to Defendants for their independent consulting work. 
Finally, in his Complaint, Williams alleged that Fix-A-Phone was worth $1.5 million. 
Based on that allegation, and absent any further disclosure, Williams obtained Tier 3 discovery 
in both quantity and time, and Defendants assert they defended this lawsuit as if it were a 
$450,000 case. As a result, a three-day jury trial has been set in this matter which would have 
00696 
WILLIAMS V. ANDERSONPAGE SMEMORANDUM DECISION 
likely been handled much differently. While Williams argues that Defendants never complained 
about the lack of a disclosure, such is irrelevant as it is Williams' obligation to disclose a 
damages calculation, not Defendants' obligation to demand one. See Utah R Civ. P.26(a)(l) 
(requiring disclosure of a damages calculation "without waiting for a discovery request"). 
Plaintiff further argues Defendants always knew of his demand on damages as being 
thirty percent (30%) of whatever the company sold for and the Defendants had this information 
in their possession. A claim of a fixed percentage for damages does not comply with the 
requirement to disclose a calculation of the damages a plaintiff is required to disclosure under 
Rule 26. 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants/Counterclaimants' Motion m Limine 1s 
GRANTED. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
ROBERTP 
DISTRICT 
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Dated: October 13, 2015 Isl ROBE~T fAliSF ~ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
) 
JACOB D. WILLIAMS, an individual, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CRAIG ALAN ANDERSON, an individual, ) 
QUINN ZITE, an individual, and ) 
ANDERSON ZITE, LLC, f/k/a FIX A ) 
PHONE, LLC, a Utah limited liability ) 
oompan~ ) 
) 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. ) 
) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
Case No. 130901891 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
******* 
This matter crune before the Court on the Motion in Limine (the "Motion") filed by 
Defendants and Counterclaimants Craig Alan Anderson, Quinn Zite, and Anderson Zite, LLC, 
f/k/a Fix A Phone, LLC ( collectively, 4'Defendants") on August 4, 2015. The Court has 
reviewed the Motion and all documents and briefing associated with it, including the Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion in Li.mine filed by Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Jacob D. 
Williams ("Williams") on August 19, 2015, and all documents associated with it. Furthermore, 
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on September 2, 2015, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion. At that oral argument, 
Richard F. Ensor appeared and argued on Williams' behalf, and Daniel K. Brough appeared and 
argued on Defendants' behalf. On September 3, 2015, the Court enkred a Memorandum 
Decision (the "Memorandum Decision") granting the Motion and preventing Williams from 
opining on or otherwise presenting damages-related evidence at trial. 
Now, for all of the reasons stated in the Memorandum Decision, the Court hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
The Motion is GRANTED. Williams is and shall be prevented from opining on or 
otherwise presenting damages-related evidence at the trial of this matter. 
HEREBY ENTERED BY THE COURT 
EFFECTIVE ON THE DA TE WHEN THE COURT ST AMP IS AFFIXED 
TO THE FIRST PAGE OF THIS DOCUMENT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH, LLP 
/s/ Richard F. Ensor 
Richard F. Ensor 
Melinda A. Morgan 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant 
(electronically signed by Daniel K. Brough with 
written authorization from Richard F. Ensor) 
Isl Daniel K. Brough 
October 13, 2015 11 :51 AM 
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